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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LARENZO EUGEAN PARK, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
LARENZO EUGEAN PARK 
Case No. 
10270 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought to review the action of 
the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Judge 
Merrill K. Faux, wherein Larenzo Eugean Park was 
convicted of negligent homicide under Section 41-6-
43.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
1 
DISPOSITION BY THE COURT 
The State of Utah presented insufficient evidence 
that the appellant was guilty of a "reckless disregard 
of the safety of others", yet the trial court, sitting with-
out a jury, found the appellant guilty and imposed 
sentence upon him. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the trial court's findings 
and sentence reversed and a finding of acquittal en-
tered. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of January 31, 1964, Larenzo Eu-
gean Park was driving an automobile owned by his aunt 
and uncle. He was accompanied by his fiancee, Diane 
Frandsen, who is now his wife. They were proceeding 
in an easterly direction along 4800 South, a two-lane, 
paved highway in Salt Lake County, Utah at about 
8 :45 P .M. The automobile was in good mechanical con· 
dition. The road was black-topped and dry. (R-40). 
Darkness had fallen. Neither Mr. Park nor Miss Frand· 
sen had been drinking. 
The Taylorsville Ward is located on the south 
side of 4800 South Street at about 1246 West. There 
were some vehicles parked on the street in front of 
the chapel and a few persons were standing near the 
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steps of the church building. The vehicle in question 
passed two other automobiles about 400 feet west of 
the chapel and returned to the eastbound lane of traffic. 
(R-196). As the vehicle passed to the front of the 
church it struck and killed Clyde Milton McMillan, 
who was in the process of crossing 4800 South Street 
in a southerly direction. The speed of the automobile 
was approximately 40 miles per hour. The posted speed 
limit in the area was 35 miles per hour. 
The victim was small in stature and was dressed 
in dark clothing. (R-34.) An indistinct crosswalk was 
marked on the highway immediately in front of the 
church with lines that were nearly obliterated. (R-42, 
72.) There was no sign in or by the crosswalk noting 
its existence, but a sign indicating the presence of a 
pedestrian crossing was placed upon a post at the side 
of the road some distance to the west of the church. 
(R-59). The night was dark and the highway and sur-
rounding area was but dimly lighted. (R-83). 
The defendant was charged with negligent homi-
cide and trial was had on June 15, 16 and 17, 1964, 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District be-
fore the Honorable Merrill K. Faux. Defendant was 
found guilty and sentenced to six months in the county 
jail and was fined $500.00. Defendant was placed on 
probation, on condition that he voluntarily serve three 
months in the County Jail and pay a fine of $250.00. 
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STATE.MENT OF POINTS 
The defendant relies upon the following listed 
points as a basis for seeking a reversal of judgment 
of the court below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON 
THE GROUND THAT THE STATE FAILED 
TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CON-
STITUTED A "RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR 
THE SAFETY OF OTHERS" AS REQUIRED 
BY SECTION 41-6-43.10, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953. 
Section 41-6-43.10 provides: 
"When the death of any person ensues within 
one year as a proximate result of injury re· 
ceived by the driving of any vehicle in reckless 
disregard for the safety of others, the person 
so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of neg· 
ligent homicide." 
At the time the court denied defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss, the Court used the following language in 
supporting its reasoning. (R-191) : 
THE COURT: 
"I am impressed with these facts which Mr. , 
\Vatkiss has not mentioned; if there was a two· 
lane street, cars parked in front of the Meet· 
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ing House, pedestrian walked from the north 
side toward the south side where he was struck 
going-we might assume-at one-tenth th~ 
admitted speed-one tenth-the admitted 
speed of the vehicle, so that he was in view 
of the driver if the driver had wanted to look 
' for probably 200 feet." 
"As the driver approached this congested 
area, with cars parked in front of the Meeting-
House, people standing and talking; and, for 
200 feet, as best he can calculate, the driver saw 
nothing in front of him, approaching the point 
of impact, at 40 miles per hour, in a second's 
time-from the time my finger reaches this 
point until it reaches it again-in that length 
of time, his car travels 60 feet; travelled at 
that rate of speed at the area where this oc-
curred, it appears that this driver was operat-
ing the vehicle with such a negligence-such 
careless disregard as this statute contem-
plates." 
"People could be expected to be crossing 
there. He was warned by a sign, which he ap-
parently didn't see, 'Pedestrian Lane,' which 
he took no notice of." 
"He didn't see for 200 feet, the person cross-
ing the highway. He travelled at a rate of 
speed, which under proper conditions, would 
not be considered illegal at 35 miles per hour; 
but, under the condition of lighting under the 
County-the cars parked by the highway, peo-
ple standing, it was utter disregard for the 
safety of others to proceed, blindly at his rate 
of speed, admitted to be 40 miles per hour-5 
miles in excess of the posted rate." 
"The Motion to Dismiss is denied." 
5 
Defendant submits this evidence, upon which the 
court's determination was made, was not sufficient to 
support the denial of defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
The Court below simply applied the wrong legal stand-
ard to the facts in this case. 
In order for a conviction to be sustained under 
the above statute, the State must prove more than the 
lack of due care on the part of the driver. The dere-
liction of the driver must meet the statutory require· 
ments and definition of criminal negligence and the 
definitive test of reckless disregard of the safety of 
others. Mere negligence does not constitute a reckless 
disregard. State v. Berchtold, (Utah, 1960) 357 P 2d 
183. 
The Berchtold case, relied on by the defendant in 
arguing his Motion to Dismiss, well illustrates the test 
which the court below should have applied. There this 
Court said, at Page 187: 
" . . . reckless disregard requires a much 
greater degree of disregard for the safety of 
others than does ordinary lack of due care for 
such safety, or mere negligence. Although the 
distinction between these two concepts is a differ· 
ence in degree of risk, this difference in degr.ee 
is so marked as to amount substantially to a d1f · 
ference in kind." 
"We conclude that if the evidence reasonably 
supports a finding that defendant consciously 
chose a course of action knowing that such course 
would place his guests in grave and serious da~· 
ger, or with knowledge of facts which would dis· 
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close such danger to any reasonable person, when 
h~ could hav~ avoided such danger, he was guilty 
of reckless disregard for the safety of others ... 
Recklessness indicates indifference and utter dis-
regard for consequences and is not mere inad-
vertence nor error in judgment." (Emphasis 
added). 
The facts of the Berchtold case are strikingly dis-
similar to those of the case at Bar and well illustrate 
a reckless act sufficient for a finding of negligent homi-
cide. 
There, the defendant was charged with driving 
his car in reckless disregard of the safety of his pas-
senger, who was killed when the car left the road on a 
curve and collided with some trees and a utility pole. 
The evidence as to speed was conflicting, but was ad-
mitted by defendant to be 70 miles per hour. The State's 
expert opinion placed the vehicle's speed at a minimum 
of 110 miles per hour. The accident occurred on a dry, 
gradually curved portion of a hard-surfaced country 
road, at 8 :30 p.m. It was dark and the weather was 
clear. Defendant testified that just prior to the acci-
dent he had increased his speed and brightened his 
lights to see which way the road turned. As he turned 
he felt the vehicle skid, whereupon it left the roadway 
and the crash occurred. On these facts the jury rendered 
•.1 
a verdict of guilty, which was upheld on appeal. To the 
aforemenioned language, the court added, at page 187: 
"Our statute does not require an intentional 
accident nor the choosing of a highly dangerous 
course while fully conscious or aware of the dan-
7 
ger confronting him in fallowing such course 
l t does require the choosing of a course with 
grave and marked dangers, and the driver must 
be conscious and aware of the course he chooses, 
and such course must be so fraught with danger 
~hat all reasonable persons, if they thought about 
it, could not fail to recognize the danger." 
It is not possible that, if confronted with the same 
situation as the Court below has described in denying 
defendant's Motion, all reasonable persons if they 
thought about it would recognize a danger to others. 
There is a clear difference between the 110 miles per 
hour, on a curve, at night, as in the Berchtold case, 
and the 40 miles per hour on a straight roadway, at 
night, toward a small man dressed in dark clothing, who 
was difficult to see, as is shown by the evidence in the 
case at Bar. 
Defendant submits that not only do the facts com-
pletely fail to show the required reckless disregard, but 
they would not even establish ordinary negligence, as a 
matter of law. The case of Charvoz vs. Cottrell, (Utah, 
1961) 36. P 2d 516, provides a startling and revealing 
comparison of factual and legal determinations. 
In the Charvoz case, the decedent was also killed 
by a defendant's automobile, as he proceeded as a 
pedestrian in a southerly direction across a dimly lighted 
street. There, too, decedent was wearing dark clothing 
and was approximately 6 feet past the center of the 
street when struck by the defendant's automobile, which 
was in the proper lane of traffic proceeding in an east· 
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erly direction. The weather was clear and the road dry. 
The fact differences in the Charvoz case in that de-
fendant was only driving about 30 miles per hour and 
the decedent was crossing in a pedestrian lane at an 
intersection are not significant. In its decision, which 
held the evidence did not require a finding of even ordi-
nary negligence, this court said, at page 518: 
"Defendant testified that he was travelling 
at a speed of approximately 30 miles per hour 
as he approached the intersection; that the head-
lights of his automobile were on low beam; and 
that he did not see the deceased until he was about 
60-65 feet from the point of impact. He im-
mediately applied the brakes, but was unable to 
stop the car in time to avoid the collision. Plain-
tiff reasons that the defendant could and should 
have observed the decedent at a distance of at 
least 100 feet from the crosswalk, which would 
have been a sufficient distance in which to stop 
the automobile and avoid striking the deceased; 
thus, defendant was negligent in failing to keep 
a proper lookout. This reasoning, however, over-
looks certain other pertinent facts. It was dark 
at the time of the accident; the street had a 
black-top surface; the intersection was only dim-
ly illuminated; the backdrop, as seen from de-
fendant's automobile, was a dark vacant lot on 
the northeast corner of the intersection; there 
was a car stopped on the north side of the inter-
section with its lights burning; and the decedent 
was wearing dark clothing. Therefore, although 
the evidence is undisputed that the defendant 
could have stopped his car in time to av~id the 
accident had he seen the deceased at a distance 
of 100 feet, the circumstances are such as to 
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create a doubt in the minds of reasonable men 
as to defendant's ability to observe the decedent 
at that distance and hence the issue of failure to 
keep a proper lookout was for the jury." 
By comparison of the recited Charvoz facts with 
the evidence in this case, it appears that this court, had 
it been confronted with these same facts in a civil action 
for wrongful death would not find defendant's conduct 
herein constituted even ordinary negligence as a matter 
of law. That defendant's conduct then is not sufficient 
to constitute the reckless disregard contemplated by 
Section 41-6-43.10 must follow. 
Of further aid in defining factually what is meant 
by "reckless disregard" are two cases construing the 
guest statute of Idaho, which holds a driver liable to his 
guest for the driver's reckless disregard of the safety of 
others. 
In the first case, that of Turner v. Purdum, (Idaho, 
1955), 289 P2d 608, the automobile in question collided 
with the rear end of a potato digger being towed by a 
tractor. The collision occurred in the darkness about 
9 :30 P .M. There was a slight wind, causing some dust, 
and an occasional sprinkle of rain. The potato digger 
had no reflector light on the rear, but the tractor had 
a white light showing to the rear. The vehicle approached 
from the rear at a speed of 45 to 50 miles per hour and 
the driver observed the white light from about ll:z mile 
away. He then did not see the light again until it was 
about 25 or 30 feet away and it was too late to stop. 
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Upon suit by the passenger, who was injured in the 
resulting collision, the plaintiff was nonsuited at the 
close of his evidence. From this nonsuit, plaintiff ap-
pealed. The Idaho Supreme Court, in affirming the 
lower court, said at page 612: 
"The evidence does not disclose that respond-
ent . . . was driving at a rate of speed which 
could constitute more than ordinary negligence 
under the circumstances. His failure to see the 
potato digger in time to avoid the accident could 
not be more than ordinary negligence. There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that respond-
ent ... was or should have been conscious of 
danger and to in di ca te a willingness on his part 
to assume the risk, or an indifference to conse-
quences." 
Can the court in the case at bar say, upon com-
parison with the Turner case, that the evidence showed 
defendant was driving at a speed which would con-
stitute more than ordinary negligence? And did the 
defendant's failure to see the small, darkly dressed 
decedent constitute more than ordinary negligence? 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant 
should have been conscious of the danger and that he 
willingly chose a course to the consequences of which 
he was indifferent. 
The case of Wood v. Taylor, ( U tab, 1958) 332 P .2d 
215, wherein this Court found a reckless disregard 
of consequences, also graphically illustrates the factual 
inadequacies of the case at bar, for such a holding. In 
that case, defendant was driving down a straight road 
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at a speed of 70 miles per hour, in the daytime with the 
sun shining, toward the crest of a sand knoll, when a 
tractor pulling a load of hay entered the highway about 
2 blocks away from the defendant's car. The tractor 
I 
after pulling on the highway, proceeded in the same 
direction as defendant's car, but in the left lane, at a 
speed of 4 or 5 miles per hour. Defendant without re· 
ducing his speed, attempted to pass the tractor on the 
right side but collided with the hayrack, causing his car 
to go out of control and roll off the road. The court 
said, at page 218: 
"Here appellant while driving at 70 miles per 
hour, saw, or should have seen, the tractor draw· 
ing a load of hay enter the highway when appel· 
lant's car was from llOO to 1400 feet away. He 
could, or should have seen, that the load of hay 
occupied practically all of the right hand side of 
the hard surf aced road. The shoulder sloped 
down and varied in width from six to eight feel, 
making it highly dangerous for appellant to 
attempt to pass on the right-hand side of the 
hay load at such a high rate of speed. He could 
not pass on the left-hand side, as he apparently 
recognized, without violating the law and risking 
the chance of meeting traffic which he could not 
see from over the top of the knoll. Thus appel· 
lant, if he continued to travel at 70 miles per 
hour, exposed himself and his guests to grave 
danger. There is no reason to belie_ve he was. not 
conscious of this danger. Certamly the JUTY 
could reasonably conclude that all reasonable 
persons under these conditions would be aware 
of the danger to which such high rate of. speed 
would expose his guests. Under such clfcwn· 
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stances the evidence shows the appellant con-
tinued to drive into the right rear side of the 
load of hay and the right rear wheel of the trac-
tor, thereby causing the accident and injuries 
complained of. During all of the time after the 
load of hay was fully within his view and ob-
structing his path to the right, he could have 
stopped his car within less than 300 feet and 
thereby would have completely avoided all dan-
ger. He could have completely stopped his car 
in about one-fourth the distance he actually 
travelled after the load of hay entered the high-
way and after he saw or should have seen that 
he was exposing himself and passengers to grave 
danger. Such conduct constitutes more than mere 
negligence. It shows he consciously continued a 
course which was highly dangerous to his guests 
when he could have, by slowing down or stopping 
his car, avoided such danger. Under all of the 
definitions above quoted, this fi\eets the require-
ments of reckless disregard for the safety of 
others." See also 2 Restatement of the Law of 
Torts, Section 500. Wil,son v. Bacon, (Idaho, 
1956) 304 p 2d 908. 
By comparison of the facts and decisions of these 
cases cited, and others too numerous to mention, it will 
become apparent that the trial court, in denying defend-
ant's Motion to Dismiss, has applied an incorrect stand-
ard of law to the facts in the case at bar in finding the 
defendants guilty of a reckless disregard of the safety 
of others. The facts of this case are almost identical to 
those of the Charvoz case (supra) wherein this Court 
found that ordinary negligence was not necessarily 
determinable. The facts are nearly similar to Turner v. 
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Purdum (supra) wherein there was a finding of no 
"reckless disregard." On the other hand, there is no evi. 
dence that defendant consciously chose a course of action 
which exposed others to danger, such as found in the 
Berchtold and Wood v. Taylor cases. (supra.) 
Defendant submits that had the area in which the 
accident occurred been brightly illuminated, which it 
was not, and if the deceased had been dressed in cloth· 
ing which was more easily visible, and if defendant's 
speed had been greater than it was proven to be, 40 miles 
per hour, and if it had been shown that defendant was, 
or reasonably should have been, aware of all these fac. 
tors, and then consciously chose to continue his course 
of activity, ignoring the existence of these facts, the test 
of the Berchtold case and the Wood v. Taylor case 
would have been met. But, since the area was dimly 
illuminated, decedent was small and dressed in dark 
clothing, and since defendant was not proceeding at a 
high rate of speed, the holdings of Charvoz and Turner 
are applicable. 
The required conclusion from a comparison of the 
cases, factually and legally, is that the evidence pre· 
sented by the State clearly does not sustain a finding 
that defendant chose a course of action when he was 
consciously aware, or reasonably should have been 
aware, that such course place others in danger and he 
was not guilty of a reckless disregard for the safety of 
others. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY A WIT-
NESS FOR THE DEFENDANT, MR. HAR-
VEY FLORENCE. 
Mr. Harvey R. Florence was standing in front of 
the Taylorsville Ward with his two sons-in-law at the 
time of the accident. He stayed on the scene and di-
rected traffic prior to the arrival of the police officers. 
In his testimony (beginning at R-147), Mr. Florence 
stated he heard the thud of impact and the screech of 
brakes, and saw an object in the air, but that he could 
not be certain what the object was. He said that the Park 
automobile could not possibly have been traveling over 
40 miles per hour (R-152) and that the impact occurred 
15 or 20 feet east of the pedestrian lane (R-154, 155, 
162, 163). There was no evidence presented which would 
show that Mr. Florence knew Larenzo Park, the defend-
ant. On the contrary, the record shows a denial of any 
acquaintance between the two men (R-153). 
In rejecting the testimony of Mr. Florence, the 
court said: (Proceedings of 17 June, 1964, page 5.) 
"I can't give credence to the testimony of Mr. 
Florence." 
Mr. Rampton: "Could I ask why, your Honor? 
He was a stranger to both parties." 
The Court: "Because he was argumentative; he was 
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eager. He was desirous of having his views im-
posed upon the court. He had an interest in tbe 
case that required me - and, in fact - did cause 
me to disregard his testimony as an honest, dii· 
interested witness." 
Mr. Rampton: "You say 'an interest in the case,' 
your Honor; I have difficulty in understanding 
what you mean." 
The Court: "An interest in having his views pre· 
vail." 
Mr. Rampton: "He was subpoenaed originally b1 
the District Attorney - or the County Attorne1 
- in the court below; that is where we got Jill 
name." 
The Court: "The only thing I can tell about him 
Mr. Rampton, is what we instruct the jury -
that you may believe one witness as against many, 
and many witnesses as against one. You may take 
into consideration the demeanor of the witnesi. 
his appearance on the witness stand; and, if you 
believe that he has testified falsely in one respect 
you may disbelieve all of his testimony unle~i 
it is corroborated by other credible witnesses or 
other credible evidence. I could not believe Mr. 
Florence." 
Defendant does not here argue that the court belo~ 
as trier of fact, could not consider the demeanor of tbt 
witness in either accepting or rejecting his testimony 
16 
Nor does defendant contend the court may not reject 
the testimony of an interested witness. However, the 
court here rejected the testimony of Mr. Florence on 
the ground that he was an interested party, "desirous 
of having his views imposed upon the court." Upon such 
an "interest," the court has here determined that Mr. 
Florence was not to be believed. Defendant submits that 
if all witnesses are to be disbelieved upon such ground, 
the administration of justice becomes virtually subject 
to the whims of the courts and not upon the orderly 
presentation of evidence, for it is not beyond reason 
that all witnesses are desirous of being believed in their 
testimony, or are desirous of having their views accepted 
by the court. 
The kinds of interest which will justify a trier of 
fact in disbelieving a witness are limited to a pecuniary 
nature, or where the witness is a party, or sustains some 
legal or contractual relationship to a party, or has an 
interest in property involved in litigation, or where the 
witness is the accused or a participant in the offense 
which is the subject matter of the litigation. Mitchell v. 
Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 P 6; Langley v. Devlin, 
95 Wash. 171, 163 P 395; State v. Douglas, 26 Nev. 
196, 65 P 802. See also 58 Am Jur 495. 
There was no proof before the trial court which 
would justify it in determining that Mr. Florence had 
any of these interests in this case, or any other interest 
as would justify the court in rejecting his testimony on 
grounds of interest. On the contrary, Mr. Florence was 
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a disinterested person who became involved in these pro· 
ceedings only because he happened to be at the scene 
of the accident. He was perhaps the closest thing to an 
eyewitness to the accident presented by either side, and 
merely related what he observed for the consideration 
of the court. 
Defendant recognizes the principle that the Court 
is not bound to believe or give credence to uncorroborated 
or conflicting testimony, but it does not appear in the 
record that the court has here considered any reason 
for rejection, aside from what it considered Mr. Flor· 
ence's interest. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE 
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENT 
HOMICIDE UNDER SECTION 41-6-43.10, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENTATION 
OF ALL THE EVIDENCE. 
The evidence presented as a part of the defendant's 
case disclosed that defendant and his fiancee, Diane 
Frandsen, were proceeding east along 4800 South Streel 
following a visit with defendant's aunt and uncle in 
Kearns. ( R-194) . They had borrowed the automobile 
of defendant's aunt and left the home at about 8 :00 p.01 
(R-204). They were on their way to Diane's home in 
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Oakley, Summit County, and were in no hurry. They 
were proceeding along the highway at about 40 miles 
per hour. (R-197, 207). 
Defendant did note the presence of some parked 
automobiles on the side of the road near the Taylorville 
Ward as they approached the chapel, but did not see any 
signs indicating the existence of the pedestrian lane. 
(R-215). About two blocks prior to the accident the 
defendant passed two other vehicles, one of which was 
pulling off to the right of the highway. (R-196, 213). 
The vehicle's lights were on low beam. (R-209). 
Neither the defendant nor his fiancee observed the 
decedent until the moment of impact, but at that time 
noted he was dressed in dark clothing and appeared to 
be small in stature. (R-198). On impact, defendant 
applied his brakes and came to an immediate stop. (R-
208). Neither the defendant nor his fiancee noted where 
the impact occurred, but a bystander, Mr. Harvey Flor-
ence, indicated the point of impact was 15 or 20 feet 
east of the crosswalk immediately in front of the chapel. 
(R-154). 
Upon realizing what had happened after stopping 
the car, defendant ran to the decedent, then into a near-
by house to summon help. Later, in this same house, 
defendant was told by Sgt. Kutulas, the investigating 
officer from the sheriff's office, that the collision was, in 
his opinion, an accident which could have happened to 
anyone. (R-200, 208). 
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The court, while agreeing that the weight of the 
evidence indicated defendant's speed to be only approxi· 
mately 40 miles per hour, otherwise rejected or ignoreo 
the substantial testimony which clearly negatived any 
finding of recklessness, and which was, in the main, UD· 
disputed. This is obvious from the comments made b; 
the court at the time announced its findings (Proceed· 
ings of 17 June, 1964, page 4) : 
"But these things have made an indelible im· 
pression in my mind-the clear sign "Pedestrian 
Lane". He didn't see it, Anybody who is watch· 
ing should have seen it." 
"Further back, there was a sign '35 miles per 
hour'. He didn't see it. There were cars parkeo 
at an angle beside the church; there were people 
standing at the approach to the church-all ol 
these were warnings." 
"He admitted that, probably, within a hun· 
dred feet of the crosswalk, he passed the secono 
vehicle, pulled out somewhere possibly over over 
into the north lane for west-bound traffic ano 
at a little more than half-a-second away at llli 
admitted speed, pulled back into his own lane oi 
traffic." 
"That, for possibly two hundred feet, as best 
I can estimate, he had an opportunity of seeing 
a person crossing. None of these safety warningi 
were seen or heeded." 
"One matter that was undisputed, having i 
bearing upon speed, and that is that the body wai 
propelled for 140 feet." 
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Defendant submits that the statement cited above, 
which constitutes the court's basis for its finding of 
guilty, clearly does not indicate facts upon which negli-
gent homicide can be based. This reasoning, in fact, 
overlooks certain other pertinent facts material to the 
case at bar. The fact of darkness and that no evidence 
was presented which would indicate the signs in question 
were lighted and visible. It overlooks the small size and 
dark dress of the deceased, combined with the dark black-
top surface of the road and the poor lighting found at 
the scene. This reasoning overlooks all of the facts which 
the court in the Charvoz case (supra) found were such 
as to create a doubt in the minds of reasonable men as to 
the defendant's ability to see the decedent at such a 
distance as would enable him to stop short of collision. 
This reasoning further overlooks the necessity of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant con-
sciously chose a course of action which he knew, or rea-
sonably should have known, exposed other persons to 
grave danger. State vs. Berchtold (supra). Wood v. 
Taylor (supra) . There is no evidence in the record which 
will sustain a finding that defendant was guilty of any 
acts which constitute more than mere inadvertence or 
inattention. A fair evaluation of all the evidence leads 
to the conclusion that defendant was not guilty of negli-
gent homicide as defined by Section 41-6-43.10. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING 
THE DEFENDANT. 
At the conclusion of the trial and upon announcin~ 
its findings, the court sentenced the defendant to six 
months in the County Jail and ordered him to pay a 
fine of $500.00. Defendant was then placed on probation 
on condition that he voluntarily serve three months in 
the County Jail and that he pay a fine of $250.00. 
At the time of sentencing, the court made the fo]. 
lowing comments: (R-233, 234). 
"I have kept in mind your argument that tllli 
could have been-could have shown features ol 
'viciousness', as you referred to the case of a 
driver a hundred miles an hour or over-vicious· 
ness that would startle the mind of an average 
person, considering safety on the highways." 
"So, I have imposed the sentence of six months 
in the County Jail and $500.00 fine. Now, I am 
going to place him on probation on condition: 
and this will be the condition: 
"That he voluntarily serve three months in th.1 
County Jail, and that he pay a fine of $250.00. 
"Now, that means this; that, if he violates hl 
probation, he will then have to pay (serve) th1 
additional three months in the County Jail, an.0 
pay the additional $250.00. In other words, .u 
he violates the terms of his probation, he ~ 
then have the original sentence to comply witn, 
But I am giving him the opportunity to accep 
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on a voluntary basis, as a condition, that he will 
submit himself to the County Jail for three 
months; that he will pay $250.00; and that, for 
six months, he will not drive a vehicle in the 
State of Utah." (Emphasis added.) 
Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah guarantees the right of appeal to the 
defendant: 
"From all final judgments of the district 
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court." 
The above quoted Section has been held applicable 
to both civil and criminal cases. See State v. Booth, 59 
P. 553, wherein this court said at page 554: 
"Here is a plain and express provision of the 
fundamental law, which grants the right of ap-
peal from all final judgments of the district 
courts. It is mandatory and applies alike to 
criminal prosecutions and civil actions. It is a 
limitation alike upon the legislative and judicial 
powers of the government. Neither the legisla-
ture by legislation nor the judiciary by interpre-
tation can lawfully deprive any person, natural 
or artificial, from his sovereign right." 
Defendant submits that the trial court, in causing 
defendant's probation to rest on his voluntary submis-
sion to the lesser and lighter sentence, has required the 
defendant to accept the court's findings and sentence 
as then announced at the peril of having his sentence 
doubled should he enter an appeal therefrom. Defendant 
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further submits that his right to appeal, as guaranteea 
by the Constitution of the State of Utah, has been re· 
stricted by the trial court which, under the above quoteo 
statement from the Booth case, cannot lawfully do so. 
The defendant's Constitutional rights have been ab· 
ridged by the trial court's sentence because he could no! 
voluntarily submit himself to jail in acceptance of the 
lighter sentence otherwise than by foregoing his right 
of appeal. 
Section 77 -35-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro· 
vides that, in certain cases "where compatible with the 
public interest," the trial court may place a def endanl 
on probation. The case of State v. Chesntd, 356 P 2a 
36, construed the above Section when this court uphold· 
ing the terms of probation imposed by a district court 
employed the following significant language at page 37: 
"Section 77 -35-17 does not set forth any neces· 
sary conditions of probation but leaves the matte1 
entirely within the discretion of the trial judge. 
'iVhile the instant order contained probation 
terms somewhat at variance with the usual orders, 
some of which are of questionable propriety, ii 
was within the province of the trial court." 
"The conditions imposed upon the def endanl 
were : ( I ) that he remain in the strict custod! 
and supervision of his bondsman; ( 2) that bf 
remain outside of Sevier County; ( 2) that bi 
report to the court on March 14th ; and ( 41 
that he 'make every effort to make entirely goou 
and his 'conduct * * * be in every way satisfac 
tory." 
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"It was implicit from the foregoing that de-
fendant's probation was conditioned upon his 
good behavior as it must be in every order grant-
ing probation. Such good behavior must be con-
duct conforming to the law." 
Defendant urges that by imposing conditions of 
probation which required voluntary service in county 
jail for a lesser period of three months as opposed to 
six months, and payment of the lesser sum of $250.00 
as opposed to $500.00, the court not only tampered with 
his constitutional right of appeal, but imposed proba-
tionary terms conditioned on other than good behavior. 
There is no good behavior implicit in the act of volun-
tarily going to jail or paying a smaller fine. Similarly 
there is no good behavior involved in the condition which 
required defendant's abstention from driving for a pe-
riod of six months. The most that can be said of the con-
ditions of defendant's probation, as imposed by the trial 
court, is that they are of "questionable propriety." State 
v. Chesnut (supra). It appears to defendant his proba-
tionary terms are wholly out of the realm of justice and 
inconsistent with the public interest. Defendant does not 
object to the status of probation, but feels the court has 
not compiled with the requirements of the law with 
respect thereto. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was convicted of negligent homicide on 
insufficient evidence and contrary to the weight of all 
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the evidence presented and was then sentenced contrary 
to his rights as a citizen of the State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, Larenzo Eugean Park urges 
the court to reverse the trial court's finding of guilty 
and its sentence pronounced thereon and to order his ac· 
quittal from the charge of negligent homicide. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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